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Melting in the Hands of the Court
M&M’S, ART, AND A PRISONER’S
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Donny Johnson pled guilty to second degree
murder for the death of John Viveiros and was sentenced to
fifteen years to life imprisonment.1 Nearly a decade later,
Johnson was sentenced to two more terms of nine years to life
for stabbing one prison guard and assaulting another.2 He is
currently an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) in
California.3 Johnson is held in the prison’s Security Housing
Unit (“SHU”), its highest-level security cell, where he is in
solitary confinement for what will likely be the rest of his life.4
For all his solitude, Johnson has been in the public eye
of late. While in the SHU, Johnson painted postcards by using
his own hair, foil, and plastic to make paintbrushes and
leeching M&M’s for paint.5 Johnson sent his postcards to a
1
Adam Liptak, Behind Bars, He Turns M&M’s into an Art Form, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2006 [hereinafter Liptak, Behind Bars], available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/07/21/us/21artist.html?_r-l&oref. Johnson and two friends
were involved in the murder, which took place at a San Jose party. Id. An argument
over the sale of PCP-laced cigarettes led to the fatal stabbing. Id. Johnson was only
twenty years old at the time of his second-degree murder plea. Id.
2
Id. At trial, Johnson claimed he acted in self-defense and that he believed a
gang member attacked him. Id.
3
Id. The maximum-security prison sits on 275 acres of Northern California
territory. According to its website, PBSP holds the state’s “most serious criminal
offenders in a secure, safe, and disciplined institutional setting.” The prison currently
houses 3461 inmates, with a staff of 1548. California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation: Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Visitors/
Facilities/PBSP.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2007).
4
Liptak, Behind Bars, supra note 1. Roughly half of PBSP’s inmates are
held in the SHU. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, supra note
3. The SHU’s inmates present “serious management concerns,” and include “prison
gang members and violent maximum security inmates.” Id.
5
Liptak, Behind Bars, supra note 1; Kim Curtis, Prison Artist Faces
Disciplinary Hearing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 4, 2002, available at
http://www.pelicanbayprisonproject.org/features/htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
Johnson’s biography appears on Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia; the biography
focuses primarily on his art, its exhibit and donation to charity. See Donny Johnson,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donny_Johnson (last visited Sept. 8, 2007). He is described

811

812

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

“pen-pal,” psychoanalyst Stephen Kurtz.6 Impressed by the art,
Kurtz displayed the postcards in a Mexican gallery in the
summer of 2006.7 The exhibition drew at least 500 people, and
approximately twenty postcards sold for $500 each.8
The success of Johnson’s gallery, however, did not
impress everyone. In response to a New York Times article on
Johnson’s art and the gallery, prison officials disciplined
Johnson for engaging in “unauthorized business dealings” by
banning him from mailing his postcards.9 Such a regulation, if
challenged before the Supreme Court, is likely to withstand
judicial scrutiny. The Court has consistently upheld prison
regulations as constitutional.10 The First Amendment in
particular is not absolute and is subject to certain restrictions
when the speaker is an inmate.11 From limitations on family
visits to magazines, the Court gives great deference to prison
administrators.12
In doing so, however, the Court may help a state
achieve an otherwise unattainable legislative goal. For
example, virtually all states and the federal government have
enacted laws that limit a criminal’s right to profit from
expressions of his crime.13 Anti-profit legislation, commonly
as “an American painter . . . known for his unconventional technique, which involves
using a paint brush made out of his own hair and paint pigment from M&M’s dissolved
in water.” Id. A description of his crimes is limited to two sentences. Id.
6
Curtis, supra note 5. Kurtz runs the Pelican Bay Prison Project, a nonprofit organization—“completely independent of and hav[ing] no connection” to
California’s Department of Corrections—that is “dedicated to the men incarcerated at
[PBSP].” Pelican Bay Prison Project, http://www.pelicanbayprisonproject.org (last
visited Sept. 29, 2007); see also Kim Curtis, Prison Artist in Hot Water: Officials Say He
Broke Rules with M&M Creations Sold for Charity, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2006, at 2.
7
Curtis, supra note 5.
8
Id.
9
Adam Liptak, Prison Disciplines Publicized Inmate who Makes Art Using
M&Ms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Liptak, Prison Disciplines
Publicized Inmate]. Under California’s Code of Regulations, inmates cannot “actively
engage in a business or profession” unless it is authorized by the head of the
institution. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3024(a) (1995). The provision defines “business”
as “any revenue generating or profit making activity.” Id. Prison officials can reject an
inmate’s mail if it “relates to the direction of an inmate’s business or profession.” Id.
§ 3024(b).
10
See infra Part III.A.
11
See infra Part I.
12
See infra Part III.
13
New York enacted its first Son-of-Sam Law in 1977. Michelle G. Lewis
Liebeskind, Back to Basics for Victims: Striking Son of Sam Laws in Favor of an
Amended Restitutionary Scheme, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29 (1994). Nearly every state
and the federal government adopted some form of anti-profit legislation. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3681 (2006); ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (LexisNexis 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020
(2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308 (2006);
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referred to as Son-of-Sam laws, have met constitutional
challenges during the past fifteen years with little success for
states.14 The standard for withstanding constitutional muster is
high—the law must be “narrowly tailored,” says the Court, to a
compelling government interest.15
Nevertheless, by virtue of judicial deference, a prison
regulation may accomplish the same goal that an imperfect,
constitutionally defective state law cannot. Thus, judicial
deference can render the state’s imperfect criminal anti-profit
law irrelevant. This Note argues that recent Supreme Court
decisions that defer to state prison administrators unfairly
curtail prisoners’ First Amendment right to freedom of
expression16 while successfully supplanting the goal of an
imperfect state law.
Part I of this Note describes the First Amendment and
its scope. Part II briefly addresses the history of the Court’s
position in reviewing prisoners’ rights cases. Part III discusses
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-201 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218 (2001); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 9103 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 1714-31 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 351-81 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5301 (2004);
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.3-3 (LexisNexis 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West 2003);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319 (1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (LexisNexis 2005);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 752-E (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-622
(LexisNexis 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 611A.68 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-38-5 (2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.045
(West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104d (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-1836
(1999); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07.1-01
(LexisNexis 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2969.01 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22 § 17 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN.. § 8312 (West); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-25.1-18 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-530
(2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28A-1 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-403 (2000);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-8.3 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (2004); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2B-2 (LexisNexis 2004);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-40-301 to -303 (2007);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West 2007) (held unconstitutional in Keenan v. Superior Court
of L.A. County, 40 P.3d 718, 721 (Cal. 2002); see discussion infra Part IV.C); MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ANN. Ch. 258A §§ 1, 9 (West 1992) (repealed 1993); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 217.007 (LexisNexis 2005) (held unconstitutional in Seres v. Lerner, 102 P.3d 91
(Nev. 2004)); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-26 to -33 (West 2001) (repealed in 2003); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (LexisNexis 2006) (repealed 2006).
14
Melissa J. Malecki, Son of Sam: Has North Carolina Remedied the Past
Problems of Criminal Anti-Profit Legislation?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 673, 677 (2006) (“[N]o
Son of Sam law challenged for constitutionality in relation to the First Amendment has
been able to withstand the attack . . . .”).
15
Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 120-23
(1991).
16
“Expression” is not in the First Amendment, but it is nonetheless an
accepted term. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 1
n.1 (1984). It includes all forms of expression, including those specifically mentioned in
the First Amendment (free speech, press, etc.) and those that have come within its
reach, including association, art, and music. Id.
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the Supreme Court’s deference to prison administration in its
regulation of prisoners. Part IV focuses on how prison
administration deference may accomplish the goal of an
otherwise unconstitutional law by highlighting California’s
Son-of-Sam law. Finally, Part V focuses on Johnson’s case
specifically and suggests extending the scope of judicial review
in prisoners’ First Amendment rights cases.
I.

THE SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”17 Taken literally,
the First Amendment protects the spoken word exclusively.18
Supreme Court cases, however, have not limited First
Amendment protection to spoken or written words.19 Instead,
the Court construes speech to include non-verbal forms of
expression, or symbolic speech, which comes within the ambit
of the First Amendment.20

17
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18
The First Amendment also protects the press, religion, assembly and the
right to petition the Government. Id. Textually, however, the only form of individual
expression it protects is speech. Id. Arguably the most protected speech is political
speech, where only “a clear and present danger” justifies suppression. See Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
19
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 569 (U.S. 1995) (“[T]he Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as
mediums of expression.”). Supreme Court cases “have never suggested that expression
about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matter—to take a
nonexhaustive list of labels—is not entitled to full First Amendment protection.” Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). Various Supreme Court cases
highlight the broad range of expression protected by the First Amendment. See Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding that expression by means of
motion pictures is protected by the First Amendment’s free speech and free press
clauses); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568-69 (finding that parades, in which the collective goal
of marchers is to make a statement, is a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment). Although recognized, certain kinds of expression merit less protection
than others. Obscenity, for example, may be seen to merit a lower level of protection
because its “patently offensive way” of portraying sex lacks any “serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
20
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (finding that a Texas
law which banned flag desecration violated the “bedrock principle” that the
“government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable”); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981) (nude dancing not excluded from First Amendment protection);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (wearing an
armband); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142-43 (1966) (silent library sit-in).
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Scholars have tried to define the speech that is
protected by the First Amendment.21 For many, however, the
real question of what comes within the First Amendment’s
scope lies in the values the amendment is meant to protect.
Various theories attempt to pinpoint the extent of the First
Amendment protection by focusing on specific values.22 One
example is the liberty model.23 Under this model, the First
Amendment protects an individual’s right to expression from
government restrictions.24 An individual’s verbal and nonverbal expressions are within the First Amendment’s
protection because its purpose is to further individual selfrealization and self-determination.25 Thus, the purpose of the
First Amendment is to permit individual growth for both the
speaker and the recipient by encouraging diverse viewpoints.26
Moreover, any limitation on individual expression hampers
society’s development as a whole.27

21
For example, Professor Emerson’s theory distinguishes between expression
and action. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17 (1970).
Although expression and action often go hand-in-hand, the extent to which conduct is
expressive determines its protection. Id. at 17-18. Expression is conduct that must be
unbridled and encouraged. Id. at 17. Action, however, is controllable but not if it
imposes on expression. Id. Thus, the government can regulate actions to protect certain
societal interests, but it cannot suppress expression in the process. Id.
22
Under the marketplace model, the rationale for free expression is the
search for truth. REDISH, supra note 16, at 45-46 (discussing John Stuart Mill’s theory
that the competition of ideas leads to truth); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 4-5 (1998). Information is viewed as a public good, and expression fosters
the exchange of that good. Id. at 5. Critics of the marketplace model cite media control
and the inability of economically disadvantaged groups from accessing information as
impediments to the model’s goals. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 965-66 (1978), reprinted in THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A READER 82 (John H. Garvey & Frederick Schauer eds., 1992). Under
the market-failure model, states should intervene to ensure that free speech fosters
ideas and achieves beneficial societal goals. Id. at 966.
23
Baker, supra note 22, at 964.
24
Id. at 966. Freedom of expression and personal fulfillment are the
cornerstone of the “self-realization” theories of the First Amendment. FARBER, supra
note 22, at 4.
25
Baker, supra note 22, at 966.
26
FARBER, supra note 22, at 4 (“If people lack access to a wide range of ideas,
they are prevented from imagining the full range of possibilities in their lives.”). Unlike
the marketplace model, however, the focus is not on the exchange of ideas to weed out
falsehood. Baker, supra note 22, at 967 (“[T]ruth is discovered through its competition
with falsehood for acceptance.”). Rather, the free speech clause protects the “value of
speech conduct to the individual.” Id. at 966. For a discussion on the marketplace,
market failure and liberty models of the free speech clause, see generally Baker, supra
note 22.
27
FARBER, supra note 22, at 4 (arguing that restricting expression limits “the
ability of writers and artists to express their perspectives, impoverishing the national
culture”).
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Notwithstanding the difficulties in defining the First
Amendment’s protected speech boundaries,28 or the particular
set of values it is said to protect, the government can restrict
the “time, place, or manner of speech.”29 Any restriction,
however, is subject to judicial review under a standard ranging
from strict scrutiny to mere rational review.30 A regulation
survives strict scrutiny if its restriction on a fundamental right
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest.31 An intermediate standard of review requires that the
regulation be substantially related to an important
governmental interest.32 A rational level of review requires only
that the regulation bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate
government interest.33 In the free speech context, a contentbased restriction must withstand strict scrutiny analysis.34
Such content-based regulations include those that restrict an
inmate’s right to profit from crime-related expressions.35 A
content-neutral restriction must survive an intermediate level
of review.36
Prison regulations, however, that impose upon an
inmate’s free speech rights are subject to the lowest level of
review.37 The government has a special relationship with an
inmate speaker.38 This relationship gives the government a
unique regulatory power over the inmate that it does not have
with the private individual.39 The crucial issue for the Court is
the extent to which a particular situation “fall[s] outside the
‘normal’ First Amendment rules,” and its willingness to defer to
28

Articulating a workable definition is at the core of the problem. Overly
simplistic definitions fail for their lack of “analytical or predictive value,” whereas
consistent definitions strip the freedom of rights the Amendment is intended to protect.
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 275 (1981).
29
FARBER, supra note 22, at 15.
30
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL..
L. REV. 297, 303 (1997). The Court’s three-tiered approach in reviewing free speech
restrictions stems from its review of equal protection challenges, where the Court has
traditionally used this approach. Id.
31
Id. at 303-04.
32
Id. at 303.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 304-05.
35
See discussion on Simon & Schuster infra Part IV.B.
36
Bhagwat, supra note 30, at 305.
37
See discussion on Turner v. Safley infra Part III.B.
38
FARBER, supra note 22, at 15.
39
Id. at 15, 187 (“Given its custodial authority in [prisons, the government]
has an unusually broad interest in controlling speech . . . .”).
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government officials.40 In the case of inmates, the strong
judicial deference to prison officials resulted in the lowest-level
standard of judicial review.41
II.

THE COURT’S “IRON CURTAIN”

The Court’s deference to prison administrators’
decisions stems from the purpose of incarceration.
Imprisonment as a form of punishment became prevalent in
the early nineteenth century.42 It replaced the more violent
forms of punishment that prevailed during colonization,
including whipping and execution by hanging.43 Rehabilitation
became the goal of imprisonment.44 Because it was believed
idleness resulted in crime, rehabilitation consisted of an inmate
working during the day, either alone or with other inmates,
and sleeping alone at night.45 Inmates were not allowed to
speak to each other and could only read the Bible.46 This view
persisted until the twentieth century, when reformers argued
that the current state of prisons further hardened a criminal.47
Despite the push for reform, questions as to whether an inmate
retained any constitutional rights resulted in little change.48
Thus, until the mid-twentieth century, courts adhered to the
“hands-off” doctrine.49
The hands-off doctrine embodied the Court’s
unwillingness to review prison administrators’ decisions.
Under the doctrine, federal courts avoided addressing whether
prisoners retained any constitutional rights.50 The primary
function of the courts was to ensure the freedom of illegally
confined individuals, not to “superintend the treatment and

40

Id. at 15.
See discussion on Turner infra Part III.B.
42
1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 6 (3d ed. 2002).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 6-7.
45
Id. at 7.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 8. Today, however, solitary confinement, or segregation, remains a
staple in prison management. The SHU is a modern-day embodiment of this traditional
form of punishment, which has received criticism for its emotional and mental impact
on prisoners. See generally Elizabeth Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement and
International Human Rights: Why the U.S. Prison System Fails Global Standards, 21
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 71 (2005).
48
MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 10.
49
Id. at 9.
50
Id. at 10.
41
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discipline of prisoners.”51 Although the Court acknowledged
some claims of racial discrimination and unsafe prison
conditions as egregious, the hands-off doctrine prevented the
Court from addressing these claims.52 Because the Court
believes prison administrators are better suited to make prison
regulations, it avoided any judicial interference in prison
administrative decisions.53 Prison administrators have to deal
with inmates on a daily basis.54 Thus, there is a fear that
judicial review may threaten prison officials’ authority.55
Despite the doctrine’s pervasiveness, the mid-twentieth
century brought a change to the judiciary’s point of view. The
Court became increasingly concerned with protecting the rights
of “discrete and insular minorities,” which loosened its
adherence to the doctrine.56 It acknowledged the rights of
accused individuals and inmates, irrespective of the prison
walls.57 Stating that there is “no iron curtain” between the
Constitution and prisons, Justice White vocally ended the longheld belief that judicial intervention had no place in prison
administration.58 Thus, inmates have constitutional rights
which federal courts have a duty to protect whenever a prison
regulation “offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee.”59

51

Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951).
See Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285, 287, 290 (D. Alaska 1951).
53
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).
54
The Turner Court explicitly mentions this concern in articulating its
standard of review in prisoner rights cases. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)
(“Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny
analysis would hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.”).
55
MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 11-12.
56
The Court’s review of police and prosecutorial treatment of accused
individuals surged in the 1960s. Lorijean Golichowski Oei, The New Standard of
Review for Prisoners’ Rights: A “Turner” for the Worse?: Turner v. Safley, 33 VILL. L.
REV. 393, 399-401 (1988). For example, the Court deemed a confession inadmissible
after the accused requested, but was denied, the assistance of counsel in Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 478 (1964), and found inadmissible the results of a search
violating the Fourth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
57
See Oei, supra note 56, at 399-403.
58
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). (“[A] prisoner is not
wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is
no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.”).
59
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974), overruled by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
52
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III.

THE SUPREME COURT’S STANDARD: TURNER V. SAFLEY

A.

The Road to Turner

The Court’s attempt to lift the iron curtain, however,
may be best described as a mere parting. Because prison
administrators determine both the goals of a prison and the
means by which to obtain them,60 the Supreme Court accords
“substantial deference to [their] professional judgment.”61
Moreover, a prisoner bears the burden of disproving a
regulation’s validity.62 Restrictions on First Amendment rights
are permitted, so long as they are reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest.63 In particular, the Court gives
substantial deference to prison administrators if there is the
potential for a security problem.64 Thus, an inmate faces an
uphill battle in challenging the constitutionality of a prison
regulation.65 Nevertheless, its own acknowledgment of the
accused’s rights and the growing recognition of inmates’ rights
prompted the Court to guide the lower courts by articulating a
test for constitutional challenges to prison regulations.66
60

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).
Id.
62
Id.
63
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Lower courts had established
their own standards. In Carothers v. Follette, an inmate sought to prevent prison
officials from censoring correspondence to his parents, judges and attorney. 314 F.
Supp. 1014, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In holding that prison officials violated the inmate’s
right of expression, the court stated that “[c]ertain restrictions on expression to
[outsiders]” were acceptable, including restrictions that prevent a legitimate business.
Id. at 1024 (citing Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 850 (9th Cir. 1951) (denying a
prisoner’s petition to bar prison administrators from interfering in his business
dealings)). According to the court, a restriction on freedom of expression must be
“related both reasonably and necessarily to the advancement of some justifiable
purpose of imprisonment.” Id. (citations omitted). A restriction is acceptable if prison
officials show it is reasonably and necessarily related to either prisoner rehabilitation
or to maintain prison security. Id.
64
WILLIAM C. COLLINS, SUPERMAX PRISONS AND THE CONSTITUTION:
LIABILITY CONCERNS IN THE EXTENDED CONTROL UNIT 72 (2004), available at
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2004/019835.pdf. A court will defer to prison officials even if
the absence of a regulation presents only the possibility of a security problem. Id. (“[I]f
an official says that lack of a particular restriction ‘might’ create a security problem, a
court will generally defer to that judgment and uphold the challenged restriction under
the Turner test.”). For a discussion on Turner v. Safley and its four-factor test, see infra
Part III.B.
65
An inmate faces not only substantial judicial deference, but must disprove
a regulation’s validity. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 132.
66
Various tests existed at both the state and federal levels to determine
when a prison regulation infringed on prisoners’ rights. Many circuits used a strict
scrutiny standard of review, requiring the state to bring forth a substantial
government interest furthered by the rule and only a minimal imposition on First
61
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1. The Outsider’s Rights
Initially, the Supreme Court avoided delineating a
prisoner’s First Amendment rights.67 The Court first held that
the First Amendment limited a prison regulation’s scope in
Procunier v. Martinez.68 Nevertheless, it failed to define a
prisoner’s free speech rights.69 Instead, the Court focused on
the rights of free citizens as opposed to those of prisoners.70 In
Martinez, California prison regulations permitted the mailroom
staff to inspect prisoners’ correspondence.71 Particularly, the
staff became watchful of any correspondence that complained
about the prison, expressed “inflammatory” views, or was
“otherwise inappropriate.”72 Whether a correspondence was
inflammatory or inappropriate was for the staff to determine.73
Although the Martinez Court found the regulation
unconstitutional, its decision focused on the rights of the
recipient.74 It set a two-part standard of review for regulations
that violated the First Amendment rights of outsiders: the
regulation cannot be over-inclusive and it must serve a specific
state interest.75 Because the sender and recipient had an
Amendment rights. See Oei, supra note 56, at 414 n.97. The more relaxed rational
standard of review prevailed in other circuits. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d
906, 911 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that deference to prison administrators prevails when
they are addressing a real danger in the prison). To highlight the confusion among the
lower courts, the same circuit often applied different tests in reviewing the regulation.
The Seventh Circuit, for example, applied the lowest level of review in Morales v.
Schmidt, where it called on the state to proffer a rational relationship between the rule
and the goal. 489 F.2d 1335, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1973); see also Oei, supra note 56, at 415
n.98. Fourteen years later, however, it used a strict scrutiny standard in Rios v. Lane,
calling for the state to present an important government interest that imposed
incidentally on a prisoner’s First Amendment right. 812 F.2d 1032, 1036-37 (7th Cir.
1987); see also Oei, supra note 56, at 414 n.97.
67
Oei, supra note 56, at 404-05. The Martinez Court acknowledged the lower
court’s confusion as to the standard of review, but nevertheless failed to provide
guidance. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406-08 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); see also Oei, supra note 56, at 404 nn.48, 50.
68
416 U.S. at 406.
69
See MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 593-94.
70
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408 (discussing how mail censorship implicates the
First Amendment rights of the non-inmates who correspond with the inmates).
71
Id. at 399-400 (footnote omitted).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 400. The rule stated that a prisoner’s personal correspondence was “a
privilege, not a right.” Id. at 399 n.1 (citing Director’s Rule 2401). Under the rule,
violation of the mail rules might “cause suspension of the mail privileges.” Id.
74
Id. at 408-09.
75
Id. at 413. The regulation had to further an important “governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression,” and the limits to free speech “must
be no greater than is necessary” to protect that governmental interest. Id.
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interest in the correspondence, the censorship violated the
rights of both.76 Regardless of the prisoner’s First Amendment
rights, the regulation burdened the First Amendment interests
of those outside the prison.77 By focusing on the outsider’s point
of view, the Martinez Court averted delineating prisoners’ First
Amendment rights.78
2. Alternative Means of Communication
The Court shifted its focus from the outsider to an
alternative means of communication only two months later. In
Pell v. Procunier, a California regulation barred the media from
interviewing certain inmates in person.79 Unlike Martinez, the
Court did not focus on the outsider’s First Amendment rights.
Instead, it centered on the prison’s goal in enacting the rule
and the deference given to prison administrators.80 Prison
administrators
argued
that
alternative
means
of
communication were available to prisoners.81 The prisoners in
this case could communicate with outsiders, including media
representatives, by writing to them.82 The Court concluded that
a regulation fell within the ambit of prison administrators’
discretion if a “reasonable and effective means of

76
Id. at 409. The Martinez Court noted the “array of disparate” standards for
reviewing prison regulations that restricted freedom of speech. Id. at 406-07; see also
supra note 66 and accompanying text. This uncertainty not only made it difficult for
prison officials to determine the appropriateness of their actions, but needlessly
“perpetuate[d] the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison
administration.” Martinez, 416 U.S. at 407. The Court possibly decided Martinez on the
narrower issue of the outsider’s First Amendment right to avoid a flurry of free speech
violation claims by prisoners. See MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 12.
77
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409.
78
Oei, supra note 56, at 406. The Court would later narrow Martinez in light
of Turner: In Thornburgh v. Abbott, prisoners challenged Federal Bureau of Prisons
(“FBP”) rules which gave wardens the authority to reject publications they considered
detrimental to the prison’s security. 490 U.S. 401, 403 (1989). The Court of Appeals
applied Martinez instead of Turner because the regulation restricted the free speech
rights of publishers. Abbott v. Messe, 824 F.2d 1166, 1168-70 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (setting a rational relation standard of review for regulations
that restrict a prisoner’s free speech right); see also infra Part III.B. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a strict scrutiny standard of review did not give “sufficient
sensitivity” to prison officials’ discretion. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 409-10. Moreover,
unlike Martinez, the regulation in Thornbourgh dealt with incoming, as opposed to
outgoing, correspondence. Id. at 412.
79
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 820-21 (1974).
80
Id. at 827.
81
Id. at 823-24.
82
Id. at 824.
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communication remain[ed] open” to prisoners83 and there was
no discrimination as to the content involved.84
3. Security Concerns and the Exaggerated Response
Another justification for judicial deference centered on
security concerns and whether the regulation amounted to an
exaggerated prison administrative response.85 The Court has
been particularly deferential where the prisoner is a recipient.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, a prisoner challenged a prison
regulation that permitted the inspection of mail sent by his
attorney.86 Prison administrators, however, expressed concern
over contraband secretly making its way to prisoners.87
Although First Amendment rights may protect an outsider
against “censoring of inmate mail,” it did not necessarily
protect the inmate.88 The Court cannot confine prison
regulations to “constitutional straightjacket[s],”89 but must
consider a prison’s rehabilitative goals and prison security.90 As
it did in the past, the Court’s analysis required deference to the
regulation.91 The regulation did not abridge the prisoner’s
rights because prison officials were merely opening, not
reading, the correspondence.92 Additionally, prison officials
were doing so in front of the prisoner.93 Moreover, prison
83

Id. at 824-25.
Id. at 826.
85
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Lab. Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 127-28 (1977);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974).
86
McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 575.
87
Id. at 577.
88
Id. at 575-76. Under Martinez, the outsider’s First Amendment rights are
protected from censorship, unless there is a legitimate government interest. Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-13 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S.
401 (1989). The McDonnell Court, however, refused to specifically recognize the
prisoner’s right. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 575-76. Instead, it focused on the regulation,
thus avoiding a delineation of prisoners’ First Amendment rights in this context. Id.
(“We need not decide, however, which, if any, of the asserted rights are operative here,
for the question is whether, assuming some constitutional right is implicated, it is
infringed by the procedure now found acceptable by the State.”).
89
McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 563.
90
Id. at 561-63.
91
Id. at 568. Under the challenged prison regulation, prison officials could
inspect “all incoming and outgoing mail” including mail from prisoners’ attorneys. Id.
at 574. The Court, however, found that prison officials had “done all, and perhaps even
more, than the Constitution requires” by opening marked attorney mail in front of the
inmate. Id. at 576-77 (“[F]reedom from censorship is not equivalent to freedom from
inspection or perusal.”).
92
Id. at 577.
93
Id. at 576-77.
84
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officials had a valid security concern that contraband would be
smuggled
to
prisoners,
even
in
prisoner-attorney
94
correspondence.
Security concerns also contributed to the Court’s
deference in Bell v. Wolfish.95 Prisoners brought a First
Amendment challenge to a regulation that only allowed
inmates to receive hard-cover books if they were sent directly
from a publisher, book store, or book club.96 As it did in
McDonnell, prison administrators pointed to the concern over
concealed contraband, this time hidden in books.97 The Court
again applied a rational relationship standard of review and
found no First Amendment violation.98 The regulation only
imposed a limitation on an inmates’ receipt of reading
materials, a limitation which was rationally related to the
government’s goals.99
Prison administrators also raised security concerns
when prisoners challenged an anti-union regulation. The Court
again emphasized its deference in Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.100 Prisoners challenged the
regulation as violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.101 Prison administrators expressed concern over the
tension likely to emerge between the unionized prisoners and
prison staff.102 Prison administrators claimed that this tension,
coupled with the tension likely to arise between unionized and
non-unionized prisoners, would result in prison riots and
94
Id. at 577. The district court allowed prison officials to open incoming
attorney-inmate correspondence if there was a likelihood of contraband presence. Id. at
574. Prison officials had to open mail marked “privileged” in front of the inmate. Id.
The Court of Appeals further restricted prison officials’ ability to open “privileged” mail
by implying that any doubt as to whether the mail came from an attorney could be
resolved via “a simple telephone call.” Id. at 574-75. The Supreme Court, however,
considered checking every single piece of attorney correspondence an administrative
impossibility. Id. at 576.
95
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
96
United States ex rel. Wolfish v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 333, 340
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), overruled by Bell, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
97
Bell, 441 U.S. at 549. They also claimed an interest in avoiding the
administrative cost of conducting more thorough book inspections. Id.
98
Id. at 550-51.
99
Oei, supra note 56, at 412 (footnote omitted). Not only was the regulation
content-neutral, but prisoners could still receive other reading material from any
source, including soft-cover books and magazines. Bell, 441 U.S. at 551-52. This
alternative means supported prison officials’ argument that the regulation was not
overly broad. See id. at 550-51.
100
433 U.S. 119 (1977).
101
Id. at 122.
102
Id. at 127.
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chaos.103 The Court considered these security concerns
legitimate government interests rationally related to the union
ban.104 Unless rules constitute an exaggerated response, courts
should give deference to prison administrators’ expertise.105
B.

The Supreme Court Solidifies Its Deferential Stance

Thirteen years after tip-toeing around prisoners’ First
Amendment rights in Martinez,106 the Court solidified its
deferential stance in prison regulation challenges. In Turner v.
Safley, the Court laid out the four factors courts should use to
determine the constitutionality of a prison regulation.107 In
Turner, prisoners challenged two Missouri prison rules as
violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.108 The
first prevented inmate-to-inmate correspondence.109 The second
regulation prevented inmates from marrying without the
superintendent’s approval.110 After setting out and applying its
new standard, the Court upheld the first but struck down the
second as unconstitutional.111
Although “prison walls [may] not form a barrier
separating inmates” from Constitutional protections,112 the
Court did not apply the Martinez test because Martinez did not
“resolve the question that it framed.”113 In cases involving only
103

Jones, 433 U.S. at 127.
Id. at 129.
105
Id. at 128.
106
MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 592.
107
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
108
Id. at 85.
109
Id. An inmate could only correspond with an inmate in another prison if
that inmate was an immediate family member. Id. The rule also allowed an inmate to
correspond with another “concerning legal matters.” Id. Otherwise, an inmate could
only correspond with another if a team of experts determined it was in his best
interest. Id. at 82 (“[T]he determination whether to permit inmates to correspond was
based on [the treatment] team members’ familiarity with the progress reports . . . .”).
110
Id. Only a “compelling” justification warranted the superintendent’s
approval of an inmate’s marriage. Id. Though the regulation did not define
“compelling,” prison officials testified that it generally meant pregnancy or the birth of
a child. Id.
111
Id. at 99-100.
112
Id. at 84.
113
Turner, 482 U.S. at 85; see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974),
overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). The regulation must “further
an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression.” Id. Prison officials must show that the regulation furthers the
government’s interest in prison “security, order, and rehabilitation.” Id. The restriction
cannot be “unnecessarily broad.” Id. at 414. Rather, it must be “no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection” of the cited interest. Id. at 413.
104
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prisoners’ rights, the “inflexible strict scrutiny analysis” in
Martinez would impede prison administrators’ ability to take
proactive steps that prevent security problems.114 Moreover,
adopting the standard in cases concerning only prisoners’
rights would make courts “the primary arbiters of what [is] the
best solution” to an issue specifically within prison
administrators’ domain.115 Without the experience in planning
or financial resources necessary to operate a prison, courts
should defer to prison administrators.116 This is further
buttressed when acknowledging prison administration’s role as
an arm of the legislative and executive branches.117
1. The Turner Factors
Given prison administrators’ expertise, the Court
adopted a reasonable relationship standard of review.118 Four
factors determine the reasonableness of a prison regulation
that restricts inmates’ First Amendment rights.119 A court must
consider (1) if the regulation has a “valid, rational connection”
to a legitimate government interest;120 (2) if the prisoner can
exercise the particular right via other available means; (3) the
impact on guards, inmates, and other resources that an
accommodation of the right would have; and (4) whether prison
administrators can accomplish their goals via “ready
alternatives” that do not impose on the prisoner’s rights.121 The
“ready alternative” must not only accommodate an inmate’s
114

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
Id.
116
Id. at 84-85.
117
Id. Separation of powers, according to the Court, warranted a “policy of
judicial restraint.” Id. at 85. Moreover, there are inherent federalism concerns when
federal courts dictate state prisoners’ rights. Id. at 84-85 (Prison management
“requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of
government.”); see also MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 595-96.
118
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (“If Pell, Jones, and Bell have not already resolved
the question posed in Martinez, we resolve it now: when a prison regulation impinges
on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.”).
119
Id. at 89-91.
120
Id. at 89 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
121
Id. at 90-91. Prison administrators, however, need not “set up and then
shoot down” all possible alternative methods of accommodating a prisoner’s right.
Nevertheless, if the prisoner can show that an existing alternative accommodates his
right without hampering the valid penological interest, a court may consider the
existence of such an alternative as evidence that the regulation is an “exaggerated
response” to the prison’s concerns. Id.
115
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right, but must also be obvious and bear only a de minimis
impact on the penological goal.122
The Court applied each of the factors to the two rules
and found that the prohibition on inmate-to-inmate mail was
constitutional.123 According to prison officials, by restricting
prisoners’ communication with each other, the regulation
limited the potential for the formation of escape plans and gang
communication.124 Given the presence of prison gangs, the
prohibition on inmate-to-inmate correspondence was “logically
connected” to prison administrators’ concern that the
correspondence would result in “a potential spur [of] criminal
behavior.”125 Moreover, the second factor was satisfied because
the regulation only limited the “class of other people” with
whom the prisoner could communicate.126 According to the
Court, this is a valid security concern because the class
includes other Missouri prison inmates.127 Thus, the regulation
was not a full-fledged deprivation of prisoners’ means of
expression.128

122

Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 91. According to the Court, the record indicated a reasonable
relationship between the regulation and the legitimate security concern of preventing
prison violence. Id. The Court also acknowledged that the more demanding Martinez
test may apply to the marriage rule, since the rights of a civilian—an outsider—may be
affected. Id. at 96-97. However, because the rule “swe[pt] much more broadly” than
necessary, it was not “reasonably related” to the prison’s security and rehabilitation
goals. Id. at 98. Prison administrators argued that the rule prevented the security
threat posed by “love triangles.” Id. They ignored, however, that love triangles could
exist regardless of a prisoner’s marital status. Id. (“[S]urely in prisons housing both
male and female prisoners, inmate rivalries are as likely to develop without a formal
marriage ceremony as with one.”). Moreover, the prison had an obvious, low-cost
alternative in the FBP regulations, which allow prisoners to marry so long as the
warden does not deem the marriage a security threat. Id.; see also 3 MICHAEL B.
MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 30-37 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing marriage rights in
prison).
124
Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. Prison administrators believed that if inmates
corresponded with those of other institutions, they might orchestrate escape plans and
assaults. Id. Moreover, the regulation, coupled with placing gang members in different
institutions, limited prison gang activity. Id.
125
Id. at 91-92. The Court noted that even federal law conditions federal
parole on “nonassociation with known criminals.” Id. at 92; see 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.204(a)(5)(v) (1987) (“The releasee shall not associate with a person who has a
criminal record without permission from the supervision officer.”). A ban on “this sort
of contact” within the prison is therefore logical. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.
126
Turner, 482 U.S. at 92.
127
Id.
128
Id. Not only did the restriction apply to the class of individuals with whom
inmates could communicate, but it was also the state’s policy of separating gang
members in order to control gang activity. Id.
123
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Likewise, the third factor weighed in favor of
deference.129 Its focus is on the accommodation’s impact on the
prison, its resources, guards, and other inmates.130 An
accommodation of the prisoners’ asserted right here threatened
“the core functions of prison administration, maintaining safety
and internal security” by making it easier for prisoners to
organize informally.131 The result of striking the regulation
would likely create a detrimental “ripple effect” that
jeopardized the liberty and safety of prisoners and guards at
multiple prisons.132 In light of this tradeoff, the Court refused to
disregard the prison administrators’ decision, particularly
given the expertise required to make such decisions.133
As to the fourth factor, the Court found no clear
alternative that could serve prison administrators’ interests
without restricting prisoners’ free speech right.134 Inmates
contended that prison administrators had the option of
monitoring inmate-to-inmate mail.135 This alternative, however,
required more than “a de minimis cost on the [prison
administrator’s] pursuit of legitimate corrections goals.”136
Requiring staff to inspect each correspondence, coupled with
the possibility of inmate-to-inmate communication via “jargon
or codes,” was an inadequate alternative to simply banning
inmate-to-inmate correspondence altogether.137 The Court
found the regulation content-neutral, “reasonably related to
129

Id.
Id. at 90-91.
131
Id. at 92. Prison administrators expressed similar organizational concerns
over prison unions in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119
(1977); see supra Part III.A.3. Here, the Court finds the concern to be even greater than
in Prisoners’ Labor Union, since accommodating the right would impact the security
concerns of more than one prison. Turner, 482 U.S. at 92.
132
Turner, 482 U.S. at 92.
133
Id. at 92-94 (“Where exercise of a right requires this kind of tradeoff, we
think that the choice made by corrections officials—which is, after all, a judgment
‘peculiarly within [their] province and professional expertise’—should not be lightly set
aside by the courts.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
134
Id. at 93. The Court turned to the FBP for guidance. Id. The FBP, however,
similarly restricted inmate-to-inmate correspondence to “protect institutional order
and security.” Id.; see 28 C.F.R. § 540.17 (1986).
135
Turner, 482 U.S. at 93. The proffered alternative echoed that which the
Court rejected in McDonnell. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974) (“If
prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an
attorney before opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration
would be imposed.”).
136
Turner, 482 U.S. at 93.
137
Id. (noting that gang members in federal prison often use codes to
communicate in their correspondence).
130
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[the] valid [penological] goals” of security and safety and not
“an exaggerated response” to those objectives.138 Thus, the
regulation did not unconstitutionally restrict inmates’ free
expression right.
2. An Analysis of the Turner Factors
The Turner Court clearly enunciated its deference to
prison administrators’ regulations. The Court, however, gave
little guidance on how to apply the Turner test.139 The first
factor calls for a rational connection between the prison rule
and the legitimate government interest it is said to further.140
The lack of a connection or a weak link weighs in favor of
striking the regulation.141 While there are some exceptions,142 it
is arguably an easy factor for prison officials to meet.143 The
government’s interests in rehabilitating prisoners, prison
security, and even budgetary concerns present an array of
reasons for satisfying this factor.144
The application of the second factor is vague. When
considering a regulation’s validity, a court must consider the
“judicial deference owed to [prison] officials” if inmates can

138

Id.
MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 28.
140
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586
(1984)); see MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 36. Unlike Martinez, prison officials did not
have to show that the regulation served a substantial government interest. Instead,
Turner lowered the burden for prison officials. They only needed to show a reasonable
relationship between the regulation and the asserted penological interest. MUSHLIN,
supra note 42, at 598-99.
141
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90 (“[A] regulation cannot be sustained where the
logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to
render the policy arbitrary or irrational.”).
142
Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1072 (W.D. Wis. 2000). A state
regulation barred prisoners’ access to sexually explicit material. Prison administrators
pointed to security maintenance, rehabilitation and sexual harassment prevention as
“legitimate correctional goals” tied to the regulation. Id. at 1073, 1079. The rule,
however, was so broad that one could reasonably find the absence of a “rational
connection between the [goal] and the ban” without the need for scientific testimony or
common sense. Id. at 1080; see MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 31.
143
See discussion on Beard v. Banks infra Part III.C.
144
See MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 28-29; Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22, 25
(5th Cir. 1992) (finding that prison regulation barring long hair and facial hair was
rationally related to the legitimate government interest of preventing inmates from
hiding contraband and weapons in their hair and beards as well as prisoner
identification); Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 261 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding a fivedollar disciplinary surcharge imposed on prisoners who violated certain prison rules
because the government had a legitimate interest in deterring misconduct and raising
revenue).
139
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exercise their asserted right via other available avenues.145
There is uncertainty, however, as to the type of rights courts
should consider. A court need not seek an alternative to the
specific right, but may seek an alternative to the general
right.146 In Turner, the Court did not focus on whether
prisoners had alternative means of communicating with other
prisoners but rather on whether they “were deprived of ‘all
means of expression.’”147 Thus, a court may defer to prison
administrators even where no alternative to the specific right
exists.
The third factor focuses on the impact of accommodating
the prisoners’ rights.148 Courts should consider the effect on
guards, prison resources, and other inmates.149 If the
accommodation results in a “significant ‘ripple effect,’” courts
must give deference to the “informed discretion of corrections
officials.”150 Despite an analysis similar to the first factor—both
factors call for a “reasonableness analysis”—the third deals
with the rule’s reasonableness vis-à-vis the plaintiff’s proposed
alternative for operating the prison.151
Finally, the fourth factor considers whether the prison
regulation is actually an “exaggerated response” to prison
administrators’ concern.152 The plaintiff bears the burden of
suggesting an alternative.153 An inmate must show that an
obvious, easy alternative exists and that, therefore, the
regulation is an overreaction to prison administrators’
concern.154 A proposed alternative, however, faces rejection if it
145
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (quoting Pell v. Procunier,, 417 U.S. 817, 827
(1974)); see Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Lab. Union Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 131 (1977).
146
See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1987).
147
Id. at 352 (emphasis added) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 92). Days after
deciding Turner, the Court addressed the constitutionality of prison policies that
prevented Muslim inmates from attending Jumu’ah, a weekly religious service. Id. at
345. Recalling Turner, the Court’s evaluation of the second factor focused on whether
inmates lacked all means of expression. Id. at 352. Although there was no alternative
to attending Jumu’ah specifically, Muslim inmates could still participate in other forms
of religious expression. Id.
148
Turner, 482 U.S at 90.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 36.
152
Turner, 482 U.S at 90; see e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587
(1984) (rejecting the lower courts’ finding that disallowing contact visits for pre-trial
detainees was an excessive response to the security concerns involved).
153
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91 (“This is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test:
prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative
method of accommodating the [inmate’s] constitutional complaint.”).
154
Id.; see also MUSHLIN, supra note 42, at 38.
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is likely to create a “ripple effect.”155 In other words, if “changes
to one area of prison administration” have negative
repercussions in another, the alternative is unlikely to
withstand judicial scrutiny.156
C.

Narrowing Turner to a Single Factor: Beard v. Banks

Although the Court discussed a multifactor test in
Turner, its subsequent application effectively condenses
Turner’s four factors into a single-factor test.157 While the Court
is unlikely to revert fully to the days of the hands-off
doctrine,158 deference to prison administration remains the lens
through which the Court analyzes a prison regulation. Such
deference offers a state legislature the opportunity to attain
goals via prison regulations that would otherwise remain out of
its reach because of unconstitutional skeins. The Court’s
language in subsequent cases indicates that unless the
connection between the challenged prison regulation and the
interest is invalid, the Court need not address the other Turner
factors.159 This is not a challenge for prison administrators to
meet. The state does not have the burden of proving a prison
regulation’s validity; rather, it is for the “prisoner to disprove
it.”160 As discussed in the following section, the Court’s
155

Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
MUSHLIN, supra note 42 at 35-36.
157
The Court continued to apply Turner in reviewing prisoner challenges to
various First Amendment restrictions, including free association and exercise rights. In
Overton v. Bazzetta, inmates and their friends and family members brought a class
action against the Michigan Department of Corrections. 539 U.S. 126, 130 (2003). They
argued that prison regulations violated a prisoner’s First Amendment right to freedom
of association because they limited visitation from children and suspended visitation
privileges for substance-abuse violations. Id. at 131; see also Trevor N. McFadden,
When to Turn to Turner? The Supreme Court’s Schizophrenic Prison Jurisprudence, 22
J.L. & POL. 135, 144 (2006). In applying Turner, the Court refused to define the scope
of the right of association and held that each visitation restriction bore a rational
relationship to a legitimate penological interest. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 131-35 (“We need
not attempt to explore or define the asserted right of association at any length . . .
because the challenged regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological
interests. This suffices to sustain the regulation in question.”). The Court went on to
apply the remaining Turner factors, even though its language indicated it need not do
so. Id. at 135-36. The Court also applied Turner in upholding a prison regulation that
prevented Muslim inmates from attending a religious service. O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987); see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
158
But see generally Owen J. Rarric, Kirsch v. Wisconsin Department of
Corrections: Will the Supreme Court Say “Hands Off” Again?, 35 AKRON L. REV. 305
(2002) (arguing that Turner’s deferential standard amounts to a modern-day hands-off
doctrine).
159
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2579-80 (2006).
160
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 132 (emphasis added).
156
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deference to prison administrators under Turner creates an
opportunity for a state to further a legislative goal by imposing
on a prisoner’s free speech right.161
Despite the Court’s analysis of each factor in Turner,
the Court’s language indicates that unless the connection
between the challenged regulation and the interest is invalid,
the Court will not address the other factors.162 Three years
later, the Court declared that analyzing and balancing each
Turner factor was unnecessary if the regulation was reasonably
connected to a legitimate penological interest.163 In Beard v.
Banks, the Department of Corrections implemented a policy
that banned inmates in the prison’s long-term segregation unit
(“LTSU”) from accessing newspapers, magazines and
photographs.164 The LTSU has two levels of segregation, but
only inmates in Level Two were denied access to newspapers,
magazines, and photographs.165 Level Two inmates, however,
still had access to “legal and personal correspondence, religious
and legal materials, two library books, and writing paper.”166 If
after 90 days an inmate’s behavior improved, he could move to
Level One, where he could receive one newspaper and five
magazines.167
The Banks Court addressed each Turner factor quickly
and, in the end, almost superfluously. Although the
Department offered several justifications for its regulation, the
Court zeroed in on one Turner factor. A single government
justification satisfied the Court: the need to motivate difficult
prisoners to behave better.168 The goal of eliciting better
behavior from difficult prisoners by providing an incentive

161

See discussion on Son-of-Sam law infra Part IV.
In Bazzetta, the Court analyzed the other Turner factors only after
concluding that the regulations satisfied the first factor. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 135.
Nevertheless, the analysis was unnecessary. According to the Court, the regulations
bore a rational relationship to legitimate interests, which was enough to sustain them.
Id. at 131-32. Hence, if the first factor is satisfied, there is no need to evaluate the
remaining Turner factors. Consequently, a regulation is unlikely to withstand Turner if
it fails to meet the first factor.
163
Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2580 (stating that the second, third, and fourth Turner
factors’ connection to the prison’s goals “add little, one way or another, to the first
factor’s basic logical rationale.”).
164
Id. at 2576.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 2578.
162
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satisfied all the Turner requirements.169 Limiting the material
a LTSU inmate can possess was validly, rationally connected to
the penological goal of inducing inmates to behave better and
discouraging Level One inmates from “backsliding.”170
Therefore, the first factor weighed in favor of the
“reasonableness” of the prison regulation.171
In applying the remaining Turner factors, the Court
found that the regulation only limited a prisoner’s access to
alternatives.172 A prisoner is only able to access some magazines
and newspapers if his behavior merits movement to Level
One.173 Even if there is no ready alternative for Level Two
inmates, the absence only provides “evidence that the
regulations [a]re unreasonable”174—it is not dispositive.175
Moreover, accommodating the prisoner’s constitutional right
would “produce worse behavior,” thus negatively affecting
prison administration.176 Further, no readily available
alternative could accommodate the inmate’s constitutional
right without bearing more than a de minimis cost to prison
administrators.177
Despite the Court’s application of the Turner
requirements, it clearly stated that its deference to the
Department’s regulation lies not in the balancing of the
factors.178 The second, third and fourth factors “add little . . . to
the first factor’s basic logical rationale.”179 Rather, the “real
task in this case”180 laid in determining whether the
Department showed not just a logical, but “a reasonable
relation” between the regulation and the penological goal.181

169

Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2578-79. Prison administrators offered three
justifications for the regulation: to motivate inmates to behave better; to minimize
inmate property; and to minimize the amount of material inmates can potentially use
as a weapon. Id. at 2579. According to the Court, “the first rationale itself satisfies
Turner’s requirements.” Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 2579-80.
173
Id. at 2579.
174
Id. at 2580 (citations omitted).
175
Id. (citations omitted).
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. (emphasis added).
181
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Thus, in certain cases, satisfying the first Turner factor
warrants judicial deference to prison administrators.
IV.

A CASE IN POINT: CALIFORNIA’S SON-OF-SAM LAW

By deciding Banks on essentially one Turner factor, the
Court gives prison administrators and their regulations ample
opportunity to succeed in the courts. Such deferential
treatment allows states to accomplish otherwise unreachable
punitive goals. To illustrate, state laws that bar convicted
criminals from profiting from their crimes have faced
constitutional challenges.182 It is not unreasonable for a state to
prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes: not only
does this show respect for the victim, but it also sends the
message that crime truly doesn’t pay. These so-called Son-ofSam laws, however, have faced intense judicial scrutiny.183
Although the Court’s standard of review is higher when
reviewing Son-of-Sam laws, a prison regulation can accomplish
at least one goal of these laws without facing the same level of
judicial scrutiny. If a state goal is to bar criminals from
profiting from their crimes, a prison regulation that bars “any
business dealing” without the warden’s permission can reach
virtually every profit a criminal can make.184 Thus, a regulation
has the potential of unfairly imposing on a criminal’s right to
free expression, while also accomplishing the goal of another
state law. If challenged, such a regulation is likely to withstand
judicial scrutiny, even though a state’s Son-of-Sam law would
not.185
A.

Preventing the Profiting from Crime: Background of the
Son-of-Sam Laws

A state has a compelling interest in preventing
criminals from profiting from their crimes.186 Son-of-Sam laws,
182

See infra Part IV.A-C.
See infra Part IV.A-C.
184
Victim compensation was one of the New York legislature’s goals in
enacting the first Son-of-Sam law. Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1991). Another goal was to prevent criminals from profiting from
their crimes. Id. Judicial deference to prison administrator’s business-dealings
regulation may not necessarily foster victims’ compensation (Johnson’s profits, for
example, are not redirected to his victims), but it nonetheless has the potential to
prevent a criminal from making any profit.
185
See infra Part IV.B-C.
186
Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118.
183
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named after the notorious New York serial killer, were enacted
to prevent a criminal from profiting from his or her crime.187
Nearly every state has or had a Son-of-Sam law on the books.188
Outraged by the possibility of a murderer profiting from his
crimes,189 the New York legislature passed the first Son-of-Sam
law.190 The law enabled the state to seize any profit a criminal
made from the sale of stories related to his or her crimes and to
place the profits in a fund for the crime victims.191 New York’s
Son-of-Sam law faced constitutional challenges in Simon &
Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board.192
B.

Simon & Schuster: Standard for Legitimate Curtailment
of Profits

Simon & Schuster highlighted the constitutional defects
of New York’s Son-of-Sam law.193 A mobster-turned-government
witness, Henry Hill, sold the story of his life in the mob to the
publisher Simon & Schuster.194 New York’s Crime Victim’s
Board determined that the book fell within New York’s Son-of-

187

The roots of Son-of-Sam laws lay in the media attention that followed the
crimes of David Berkowitz. Sam Roberts, Criminals, Authors, and Criminal Authors,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1987, § 7, at 1. Between 1976 and 1977, Berkowitz killed six and
injured seven people in New York City while sending letters to authorities and the
media under the pseudonym “Son of Sam.” Id.; see also Anemona Hartocollis, Court
Hears “Son of Sam” in Dispute over Personal Mementos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at
B4.
188
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
189
Roberts, supra note 187, at 1.
190
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991) (amended by
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-1(b) (McKinney Supp. 1993)). The law specifically stated that:
Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity
contracting with any person or the representative . . . of any person, accused
or convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of such
crime . . . or from the expression of such accused or convicted person’s
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime, shall submit a
copy of such contract to the board and pay over to the board any moneys
which would otherwise, by terms of such contract, be owing to the person so
accused or convicted or his representative.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
191
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991) (amended by N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 632-1(b) (McKinney Supp. 1993)). (Because the original law applied to
convicted criminals, it had no effect on Berkowitz, who was adjudged incompetent to
stand trial. Nevertheless, he voluntarily gave the royalties he received from the book
Son of Sam to his victims. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 111.)
192
Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 105.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 112.
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Sam law.195 The Victim’s Board ordered Hill to hand over the
profits made under the contract and ordered Simon & Schuster
to turn over any future moneys payable to Hill.196
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the statute
violated the First Amendment.197 Content-based restrictions,
which focus on the subject of the prisoner’s speech, are
presumptively unconstitutional.198 A financially burdensome
law based on the speaker’s speech content, as opposed to
speech generally, is “presumptively inconsistent with the First
Amendment.”199 Unless the statute was narrowly tailored to a
compelling governmental interest, it violated the First
Amendment.200 Although the state had a compelling interest in
victim compensation, particularly “from the fruits of [a] crime,”
New York’s Son-of-Sam Law was not narrowly tailored to meet
that goal.201 The statute specifically targeted the content of
speech—the author’s crime—imposing a financial burden it did
not impose on other types of speech.202 The Court found the
statute overly inclusive in two ways: (1) the subject of the work
is irrelevant, so long as there is a mention, even in passing, of
the author’s crimes; and (2) convictions were irrelevant.203
195

Id. at 114.
Id. at 114-15.
197
Id. at 123.
198
Id. at 115. Generally, the extent of the First Amendment’s protection turns
on whether a restriction is content-based or content-neutral. See FARBER, supra note
22, at 21; John B. Kopf III, Note, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.: Contorting Secondary
Effects and Diluting Intermediate Scrutiny to Ban Nude Dancing, 30 CAP. U. L. REV.
823, 826 (2002). A regulation is content-neutral if it “serves purposes unrelated to the
content of expression.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). A
content-based regulation considers the substance of expression, such as its topic. Kopf,
at 827. A content-neutral regulation, however, focuses on the “non-communicative
impact of expression.” Id. at 828. The Court reviews content-based speech legislation at
a higher standard, including content-based restrictions on inmates. Simon & Schuster,
502 U.S. at 115-18. For a review of the content-based and content-neutral distinction,
see generally Kopf, supra at 825-31.
199
Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439, 447 (1991)).
200
Id. at 118.
201
Id. at 120-21.
202
If an inmate profited from publishing a book on his crime, the regulation
reallocated those profits to the Victims’ Board. FARBER, supra note 22, at 24. It did not,
however, prevent the inmate from publishing books. Id. Thus, the regulation was
content-based because a “criminal could profit from writing a book on any subject
except for his crimes.” Id. at 24-25.
203
Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121. There was no distinction between an
accusation and a conviction—an author’s mere admission that he committed a crime
sufficed. Id. The Court mentioned, but did not address, the statute’s potential underinclusiveness. Id. at 122 n.1. A statute is under-inclusive when its reach becomes too
narrow to fully serve the state’s interest. Kathleen M. Timmons, Natural Born Writers:
196
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C.

California’s Son-of-Sam Law: An Unconstitutional
Anti-Profit Statute

Despite the constitutional challenges to New York’s law,
California’s Son-of-Sam law exhibited constitutional flaws
similar to New York’s.204 In Keenan v. Superior Court,205 Frank
Sinatra, Jr. sought compensation under California’s then Sonof-Sam law (Section 2225(b)(1) of the California Civil Code)206
after his kidnappers agreed to produce a story about the
kidnapping plot with the New Times Los Angeles.207 After
selling the story to Columbia Pictures, Sinatra demanded that
the studio withhold payment to the kidnappers and the New
Times Los Angeles.208
The court applied the Simon & Schuster analysis after
finding that Section 2225(b)(1) “impose[d] content-based
financial penalties on protected speech”209 similar to the defect
in the New York law.210 Like the New York law, Section
2225(b)(1) confiscated income “from all expressive materials,
The Law’s Continued Annoyance with Criminal Authors, 29 GA. L. REV. 1121, 1133
(1994). Son-of-Sam laws, it is argued, are under-inclusive because they only reach
profits made “from the publication of the criminal’s thoughts” and not his assets
overall; thus, they fail to serve the state’s goal of victim compensation. Kevin S. Reed,
Criminal Anti-Profit Statutes and the First Amendment: Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New
York Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991), 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1060,
1067 (1992). For an argument on the under- and over-inclusiveness of Son-of-Sam laws,
see Timmons, supra, at 1141.
204
Keenan v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 40 P.3d 718, 726 n.11 (Cal. 2002)
(“The New York law, like [California Son-of-Sam Law] Section 2225(b)(1), established
priorities of claims against the account, including the criminal’s valid claim for
expenses of legal representation. Unlike Section 2225(b)(1), the New York law allowed
general creditors of the criminal to reach the impounded funds, but provided that if no
claims against the account were pending at the end of the five-year period, remaining
funds in the account would be repaid to the criminal.” (citations omitted)).
205
Id. at 718.
206
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(b)(1) (West 2001) (“All proceeds from the
preparation for the purpose of sale, the sale of the rights to, or the sale of materials
that include or are based on the story of a felony for which a convicted felon was
convicted, shall be subject to an involuntary trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries set
forth in this section.”).
207
Keenan, 40 P.3d at 722-23. Barry Keenan, Joseph Amsler and John Irwin
conspired to and kidnapped Sinatra in 1963. Id. at 722. Sinatra was released after his
father, Frank Sinatra, paid a ransom. Id. Sinatra’s business and reputation took a hit
when his kidnappers told the media that he himself took part in the kidnapping plot,
although they later admitted this was false. Id. In 1998, the kidnappers agreed to
produce a story with the New Times Los Angeles. Id. at 722-23. They intended to sell
the story to print, broadcast, and film media. Columbia Pictures bought the rights to
the story entitled “Snatching Sinatra.” Id.
208
Id. at 723.
209
Id. at 725-26.
210
Id.
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whatever their general themes or subjects, that include
significant discussions of their creators’ past crimes.”211 In
finding California’s latest version of its Son-of-Sam law
unconstitutional, the Court held that the statute “penalize[d]
the content of speech to an extent far beyond that necessary to
transfer the fruits of crime from criminals to their
uncompensated victims.”212 The court specifically addressed an
inmate’s expressive activity, finding that the latest version of
the statute was over-inclusive.213 The Court’s deference to
prison administration regulations makes the constitutionality
of a Son-of-Sam law irrelevant. Regardless of the expression’s
relation to the crime, the Court’s deferential approach to prison
administrators’ regulations simultaneously accomplishes the
state’s goal of limiting an inmate’s profit-making.
V.

RETHINKING TURNER

A.

An Application of Turner

Assuming that Johnson did in fact engage in an
unauthorized business transaction,214 and that prison
administrators only barred him from mailing his postcards,215
211

Id. at 726.
Id. at 721.
213
Id. at 732. Although the court concluded that Section 2225(b)(1) was
unconstitutional, it did not address Section 2225(b)(2), the “notoriety value” provision
of the statute; the court specifically stated that it only addressed the “storytelling about
the crime,” and no other severable portions of the statute. Id. at 729 n.14.
212

California’s Son-of-Sam law has a feature New York’s did not; besides
confiscating a convicted felon’s income from telling his crime story, the
California statute, by amendments adopted after Simon & Schuster, also
confiscates profits earned by a convicted felon, or a profiteer, from the sale of
memorabilia, property, things, or rights for a value enhanced by their felonyrelated notoriety value. (section 2225(b)(2).) Thus, it cannot be said that
California’s law, read as a whole, burdens income from speech as distinct
from all other crime-related income. The Attorney General urges that this
distinction between the California and New York statutes means the
California law is not a content-based regulation of speech. We disagree.
California’s effort to reach the fruits of crime beyond those derived from
storytelling about the crime might bear on whether our statute is
unconstitutionally underinclusive, an issue we need not and do not decide.
Id. at 729, n.14.
214
All of the proceeds from the sale of Johnson’s art went to charity. Liptak,
Prison Disciplines Publicized Inmate, supra note 9; Curtis, supra note 6.
215
While prison administrators barred Johnson from mailing his postcards, it
is unclear if they disciplined Johnson in other ways, such as by barring him from
painting altogether. Liptak, Prison Disciplines Publicized Inmate, supra note 9 (“A
prison artist [Johnson] . . . has been disciplined for what a prison official yesterday
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the Turner factors are likely to pin the outcome of his case
before a court in favor of prison administrators. Following
Banks, a full balancing of the Turner factors is unnecessary.216
If prison administrators can deliver to the court a valid,
rational relationship between the regulation and a legitimate
penological interest, there is no need for a court to consider the
remaining Turner factors. Moreover, satisfactorily meeting the
first Turner factor may result in an additional victory for the
state—that of preventing another criminal from “profiting,” in
any way, because of his status as a criminal.
Turner’s first factor acts as a gatekeeper for a court’s
further analysis. The prison regulation must bear a valid,
rational relationship to a legitimate penological interest.217
Prison administrators have cited security and budgetary
concerns as legitimate interests for enacting a prison
regulation.218 These concerns provide viable arguments for
prison administrators in Johnson’s case. They may also cite
their interest in ensuring that inmates abide by prison
regulations. Making an exception in Johnson’s case would
encourage other inmates to engage in “unauthorized business
dealings” or to break other prison rules. Should these
arguments satisfy a court, there is no need for further inquiry:
the analysis stops here.219 Under Banks, so long as prison
administrators present a single justification logically related to
their rule, a court will defer to prison administrators.220
Moreover, analyzing the regulation under the remaining
Turner factors would likely yield the same result. An
application of the second factor demonstrates that Johnson is
in fact able to exercise his right to communicate artistically via
other means. Prison administrators can argue that, though
Johnson’s specific right to paint may be restricted, he can still
exercise his general right to free expression to the extent that
any prisoner can.221 The Pelican Bay Prison Project’s website
called ‘unauthorized business dealings’ in the sale of his paintings. The prison has also
barred [Johnson] from sending his paintings through the mail.” (emphasis added)).
216
See supra Part III.C for a discussion on Banks.
217
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see supra Part III.B for a
discussion on this factor.
218
See supra Part III.A.2-3 for a discussion of the various concerns prison
administrators presented to the Court.
219
See supra Part III.C for a discussion on Banks.
220
Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2580 (2006).
221
For an example of the specific/general right distinction, see supra note 146
and accompanying text.
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includes a section called “Donny’s Page,” in which Johnson’s
essays on various topics can be found.222 Johnson has also
written a book in which he describes his life in prison.223
Further, Johnson could have raised money for charity via the
Prison Art Project,224 a not-for-profit that supports the artistic
endeavors of California prisoners225 and returns part of the
donations to the inmate-artist.226
Additionally, a court may find that accommodating
Johnson’s right will negatively impact guards and inmates. If
Johnson goes unpunished, other inmates may consider it a sign
that prison administrators are either giving Johnson
preferential treatment or that prison administrators are
unlikely to discipline inmates if they violate a prison
regulation. Either outcome would lead to more prison
regulation violations, subordination of prison guard authority,
and a hindrance of prison guards’ ability to maintain prison
security. Thus, the accommodation’s potential effects are
sufficient for a court to side with prison administrators.
The problem lies in the potential likelihood of this result
under Turner. The regulation can potentially bar Johnson from
profiting from any exercise of expression, even if his artwork
exhibits no relation to his crimes. Despite the constitutional
invalidity of California’s Son-of-Sam laws and the challenges
that these laws have faced,227 Turner allows the state to prevent
an inmate from making a profit from any form of expression.
The result is contrary to one of the very purposes of
incarceration and, more importantly, to the First Amendment’s
right to free expression.

222

Pelican Bay Prison Project: Donny’s Page, http://www.pelicanbayprison
project.org/donny.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). The webpage states Johnson will
write an essay monthly and includes links to his past essays. Id.
223
Johnson’s book, DONNY: LIFE OF A LIFER, can be ordered through his
website. Donny Johnson’s Website, http://members.tripod.com/donnyj_pelican/id22.htm
(last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
224
Prison Art Project—Prisoner Made Arts and Crafts for Sale,
http://www.prisonart.org/index.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
225
Prison Art Project: Prison Art—Donations, http://www.prisonart.org/
donate.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
226
Ten percent of sales proceeds are allocated to maintaining the site. E-mail
from Ed Mead, Prison Art Project Director, to Melissa Rivero (Jan. 1, 2007, 18:23 EST)
(on file with author). They are then distributed to inmates, who can use the proceeds
for any reason, including supporting their families and purchasing art supplies. Id.
227
See Malecki, supra note 14, at 681-87.
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The Interests Turner Ignores

If the goals of the prison system are to both punish and
rehabilitate, Johnson’s right to exercise his First Amendment
right to expression serves both goals.228 First, Johnson’s
inability to mail his paintings impedes rehabilitation.229
Johnson has stated that proceeds from the sale of his artwork
will go to an educational fund for the children of other
inmates.230 Rehabilitation undoubtedly includes an inmate’s
beneficial contribution to society. Arguably, Johnson’s ability to
rehabilitate is already limited: he is confined in the SHU and is
unlikely to ever leave it. There is very little he can do to either
rehabilitate or contribute to society. Proceeds from his work
can help children of other inmates, who are already
disadvantaged by the absence of at least one parent.231
Johnson’s donations, therefore, may actually contribute to
crime prevention.
In terms of punishment, challenges as to the
constitutionality of confinement in the SHU illustrate the
severity of this form of punishment.232 Johnson’s crimes merit
some form of punishment and certainly many years of it. Aside
from the death penalty, however, confinement in the SHU is as
severe a punishment as can be imposed on a human being.233
His years in the SHU, and the many yet to come, serve a
prison’s punitive function. His status, however, as a criminal
should not deprive him of the very few rights he has left,
particularly if they benefit others.
Furthermore, by classifying sales of an inmate’s artistic
expression as business dealings, the state can accomplish at
least one goal that an imperfect law does not. Given the
relative ease with which prison officials can meet Turner, such
a regulation can withstand constitutional muster. The criminal
notoriety associated to Johnson’s art may result in a premium

228

See supra Part II for a discussion of rehabilitation.
Vasiliades, supra note 47, at 78-79. Vasiliades discusses the findings of
psychological studies conducted on inmates in Pelican Bay’s SHUs. According to the
studies, SHU inmates like Johnson suffer from extreme psychological trauma,
including irrational anger and suicidal thoughts. Id.
230
Liptak, Behind Bars, supra note 1.
231
See ELLIOT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 82-91 (1998)
(discussing various preventive measures for thwarting crime, particularly those
targeted to children of high-risk families, which include single-parent households).
232
See generally Vasiliades, supra note 47.
233
Id.
229
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for his artwork. As it is, many states, including California,
attempt to limit a criminal’s ability to profit from his crime via
Son-of-Sam laws.234 In Johnson’s case, the business dealing
regulation can prevent him from profiting from any form of
expression. While some may argue that Johnson merely needed
to ask the warden for permission before mailing his postcards
for exhibition, a warden can conceivably deny Johnson’s
request for any reason.235 Balancing these interests, however, is
not a task that should be undertaken via Turner alone.
1. Focusing on the Outsider: Revisiting Martinez
A court can consider revisiting Martinez to prevent
unwarranted judicial deference to prison administrators. Like
Martinez,
the
prison
regulation
involved
inmate
correspondence.236 Prison administrators disciplined Johnson
by barring him from mailing his postcards.237 As the Court
stated in Martinez, it is irrelevant that the outsider is the
“author or intended recipient” of a correspondence.238 The First
and Fourteenth Amendments protect both parties from
“unjustified governmental interference with the intended
communication.”239 Moreover, communication does not occur
when one “writ[es] words on paper,”240 but rather when it is
read.241
While the communication in Martinez—a letter—is
distinct from the artwork Johnson sent Kurtz, an argument
can nevertheless be made as to communication. A letter
effectively communicates when it is read, but a piece of art is
arguably communicated when it is viewed. By denying Kurtz
the opportunity to view a communication via artistic work, a
prison regulation may infringe, at the very least, on his
interest “in securing that result.”242 Moreover, if the value of
self-determination is one held by every individual, the
234

See supra note 13 (listing the federal and states’ anti-profit legislation).
Many prison administrations cited security as a reason for a particular
regulation. See supra Part III.A.2-3 (discussing the possible security concerns that may
justify a regulation).
236
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 398-99 (1974), overruled by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); see also supra Part III.A.1.
237
Liptak, Prison Disciplines Publicized Inmate, supra note 9.
238
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408-09.
239
Id. at 409.
240
Id. at 408.
241
Id.
242
Id.
235
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regulation deprives outsiders of the right to receive Johnson’s
expression. Thus, society as a whole is deprived of what could
potentially be the work of a gifted artist.243
Prison administrators can argue that their choice for
disciplining Johnson is the most rational way to punish him for
violating the business-dealings regulation. By preventing
Johnson from mailing his paintings, prison administrators are
simply barring the means through which he engaged in the
unauthorized business transaction. The argument, however,
fails because it imposes unfairly on the rights of an outsider,
who is not subject to the same restrictions as an inmate.244
2. The Retaliation Factor: Abu-Jamal v. Price
Another view the Court can adopt in Johnson’s case is
that followed by the Third Circuit in Abu-Jamal v. Price.245 In
1982, a jury convicted Mumia Abu-Jamal for the murder of
Officer Danny Faulkner.246 Abu-Jamal worked as a journalist
before his murder conviction.247 National Public Radio (“NPR”)
interviewed him in 1994, and paid Abu-Jamal for the
interview.248 NPR intended to air segments of the interview as
prison-life commentaries.249 A police organization protested
Abu-Jamal’s ability to benefit from his crime.250 In response,
prison officials inspected Abu-Jamal’s mail and initiated an
investigation into whether he violated the prison’s business
rule.251 Abu-Jamal brought suit, claiming the regulation
violated his free speech rights.252

243
Through his studio manager, abstract artist Kenneth Noland
complimented Johnson not only for having talent, but for doing “wondrous things with
what he’s got.” Liptak, Behind Bars, supra note 1.
244
See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the custodial relationship between the
state and the inmate).
245
Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1998).
246
Steve Lopez, Wrong Guy, Good Cause, TIME, July 31, 2000, at 24. Officer
Faulkner made a traffic stop on William Cook, Abu-Jamal’s brother, when Abu-Jamal
encountered the two. He and Officer Faulkner traded gunfire. By the time police
arrived, Abu-Jamal had been shot in the chest. Officer Faulkner succumbed to his
injuries. Id. Abu-Jamal was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Abu-Jamal,
154 F.3d at 130.
247
Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 131.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 130.
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In applying Turner, the Third Circuit found that prison
officials imposed the regulation in retaliation for the content of
his commentaries.253 Abu-Jamal demonstrated that the
business rule, as applied to him, was not reasonably related to
a legitimate government interest. Contrary to Turner, prison
officials imposed the rule based on the content of his writing.254
There was no indication that Abu-Jamal’s writing or
broadcasted commentaries “strained prison resources,”
negatively impacted other prisoners, or increased danger to
Abu-Jamal or others.255 Moreover, prison officials had an easy,
readily available alternative in merely applying the rule in a
content-neutral manner.256
Johnson bears strong similarities to Abu-Jamal.
Johnson’s activity is an exercise of expression under the First
Amendment.257 Prison officials punished Johnson only after the
New York Times published an article about his artwork and its
sale to the public at a Mexican gallery.258 Like Abu-Jamal,
prison officials argued that Johnson violated the state’s
business-dealings rule,259 despite previously engaging in similar
activity without objection.260 Unlike Abu-Jamal, however, the
“content” of Johnson’s expression is not words, but art, which is
arguably subject to individual interpretation. Thus, like AbuJamal, the facts in Johnson’s case may withstand a Turner
analysis.
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Id. at 134.
Id. at 133. In particular, the first factor calls for the court to determine if
the regulation is content-neutral. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Moreover, there was no
evidence that indicated prison officials disciplined and investigated Abu-Jamal out of
security concerns. Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 135.
255
Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 134. The third Turner factor considers the impact
an accommodation of the prisoner’s right would have on prison resources, guards and
inmates. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. No evidence suggested that Abu-Jamal’s writings
“strained prison resources, contributed to unrest among the inmate population, or
enhanced Jamal’s stature as a prisoner” more so than writings by other inmateauthors. Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 134.
256
Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 135. The Abu-Jamal court did not address the
second Turner factor because neither party mentioned it. Id. at 137 n.5.
257
See discussion on the First Amendment supra Part I.
258
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
259
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3024(a) (1995); see supra note 9.
260
Besides painting, Johnson writes for the Pelican Bay Prison Project and
wrote his autobiography. See supra notes 222-223. Abu-Jamal continued to write
articles while in prison. Abu-Jamal, 154 F.3d at 131. The superintendent even
commended Abu-Jamal for an article published in the Yale Law Journal. Id. at 131.
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CONCLUSION
A court’s analyses should not be limited to the Turner
factors. Turner stands for the lowest-level of judicial review.261
It is “categorically deferential, and does not discriminate
among degrees of deprivation.”262 While in many cases the key
role of prison administrators may require judicial deference,263
cases like Johnson demand more than what Turner requires.
Johnson is exercising his free expression right, which prison
administrators restricted via a regulation that unfairly targets
his expression. Not only is Johnson’s right in jeopardy, but so is
the free expression right of outsiders.264 Moreover, Johnson’s
punishment for his crimes—solitary confinement—already
limits his ability to rehabilitate.265
Under such circumstances, the Court should consider
and balance other factors to ensure that prison administration
decisions limit an inmate’s constitutional right only to the
extent necessary. The balancing should include the prison
regulation’s impact on those outside the prison.266 A court
should give substantial weight to any infringement of an
outsider’s First Amendment right. Moreover, the effect of a
prison regulation, not just the purpose of enacting it, should
play a role in judicial analysis.267
Additionally, if a state law addresses part of the
regulation at issue—such as an inmate’s profit-generating
activity—courts should abstain from reviewing the issue if the
state has not clearly spoken on it on its constitutionality. The
business-dealings regulation potentially impinges on every
expression made by an inmate. Son-of-Sam laws fail before the
Court because they target speech-content.268 While a contentneutral regulation is more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny,
the effect of the business-dealings rule bars any exercise of
261
262

See discussion on Turner, supra Part III.B-C.
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting).
263

Id. at 358 (citing Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir.

1985)).
264

Kurtz and the public are deprived of his artwork.
See generally Vasiliades, supra note 47 (discussing the U.S. prison system
in the context of human rights).
266
See supra Part V.B.1 (suggesting that courts should include Martinez’s
consideration of the outsider’s right in inmate constitutional challenges to prison
regulations).
267
See id.
268
See supra Part IV for a discussion of Son-of-Sam legislation.
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expression, and thus any potential to generate profits. The
reality, however, is that Son-of-Sam laws are meant to do just
that—to prevent criminals from making any profits.
Preventing Johnson from mailing his postcards may discipline
Johnson, but it also bars him from profiting from a creation
that may have a “premium” simply by his notoriety, a goal that
California unsuccessfully tried to accomplish via its previous
Son-of-Sam laws. If the Court considered these factors—a
prison regulation’s impact on outsiders, its prohibitive effect on
the free expression right of inmates, and the state’s current
anti-profit legislation—in addition to the Turner factors, it
would reach outcomes that adequately protect the already
limited rights of inmates. Understandably, legislatures want to
prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes. Such a goal,
however, should be promulgated by statute, not by uncertain
judicial inclinations favoring deference. While it is true that
the relatives of Johnson’s victims would not be compensated,
the goal of Son-of-Sam laws is arguably to punish criminals
more so than to compensate victims. Johnson is being punished
for exercising his First Amendment right, a right that is one of
the few he has left and one that the Court is obliged to protect.
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